Burge v. Behr — Case 94 CV 1928

Reopened as

Burge v. Hembree — Case 99 CV 327

1st Judicial District — Jefferson County

United States District of Colorado

District Judge Gaspar Perricone — Case 94 CV 1928
District Judge Leland Anderson — Case 94 CV 1928
District Judge Christopher Munch — Case 95 CV 1129
Federal Magistrate Bruce Pringle — Case 95 S 906
Federal District Judge Daniel Sparr — Case 95 S 906
Court of Appeals Karen Metzger, Arthur Roy, Claus Hume — Case 95 CA 752
Colorado Supreme Court
United States Supreme Court
Reopened as Burge v. Hembree: District Judge Ruthanne Polidori — Case 99CV327
Court of Appeals Leonard Plank, James Casebolt, and Raymond Jones — Case 00CA 328

Colorado District Court — Case 94 CV 1928

Hearing date: January 26, 1995
Matter before the bar: Quiet Title Action — Judge Gaspar Perricone

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was garnishing the husband's paycheck to pay off a tax lien which they had secured on the home. In a malicious and illegal display of power, the IRS terminated the wage levy and sold the lien without the statutory 10-day and 30-day notices. In addition to illegally failing to send notices to the homeowner, the IRS Code forbids selling a lien on a primary residence if the tax is being paid through wages.

Behr, an auctioneer for the IRS and an investor, purchased the IRS tax lien and subsequently served an eviction notice on Burge in October 1994. Because the auction was held without giving notice, the homeowner had no chance to apply for, or secure, a loan with which to settle the tax debt that was already being paid through wage garnishment.

The illegal auction by the IRS resulted in a huge "windfall" profit to the investor, Behr, and total financial ruin for the homeowner, Burge, as the $250,000 home was conveyed by the IRS to Behr for $60,000.

The homeowner responded by challenging the tax sale as illegal and, therefore, void. The Jefferson County district court, Judge Gaspar Perricone, set two hearing dates: one for January 1995 to conduct an eviction hearing and a date for trial to Quiet Title for March 1995.

Note that the eviction was scheduled prior to the date for determining title rights. This is in violation of settled law — whereby an eviction cannot take place unless and until the title dispute is adjudicated. Title disputes cannot be heard at eviction hearings, Tyler v. McKenzie , 43 Colo. 233; 95 P. 943; Beman v. Rocky Ford Nat'l Bank , 100 Colo. 64, 65 P. 2d 709; Stone v. Lerner, 118 Colo. 455, 195 P. 2d 964; Wise V. Schimmel , 76 Colo. 1984, 230 P. 786; Kelly v. Hallack Lumber, 22 Colo. 221, 43 P. 1003; Hamill v. Bank of Clear Creek , 22 Colo. 384, 45 P. 411.

Judge Gaspar Perricone, who was personally known to Behr, deemed the lien purchase from the IRS equivalent to the title to the house — even though state and federal law does not provide for real property titles to be conveyed at auctions. Only an interest in the property can be purchased at an auction — see chart below.

Relying on well established law, the homeowner asserted that Judge Perricone had no jurisdiction to conduct an eviction hearing without first having the trial to quiet title and a foreclosure. Ignoring the law, Gaspar Perricone proceeded without jurisdiction.

After objecting to the illegally seized jurisdiction, the homeowner provided evidence at the eviction hearing establishing serious fraud and abuse conducted by the IRS and the investor. Judge Perricone ignored the evidence saying he could not adjudicate a federal law.

To circumvent state and federal law, Judge Perricone arrogantly entered an order at the eviction hearing "finding" that the investor had acquired full ownership and possessory rights at the auction, without the need to have a court trial, a foreclosure, or any court proceedings whatsoever in complete disregard of both state and federal law. His unique method of "conveying title" deprived all other lienholders of their right to notices regarding the liquidated property.

As a result, the homeowner and their three children were evicted into the snow by armed deputies seven days after the eviction hearing in January of 1995.

The Relevant Law

How Judge Perricone Corrupted The Law

C.R.S. § 13-40-104 Jurisdiction. There cannot be an eviction hearing unless one of four conditions exist: To wit: That first there must be (a) a broken lease between the parties; (b) a broken mortgage contract between the parties; (c) a squatter on the property; or (d) a court order from a previous foreclosure action conveying the title to the person conducting the eviction against the occupants.

Judge Perricone did not require any of these conditions and therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the action. However, Perricone ignored these laws and simply ordered the eviction of the homeowner. Judge Perricone, simply held that an auction conveys title to property. In reality, the investor had only purchased a tax lien at an auction but had not yet foreclosed on that lien.

C.R.S. § 38-39-102(1)(a) Conveyance of real property title

C.R.S. § 38-35-117

C.R.S. § 38-38-701 Foreclosure of mortgages and right to cure and redeem.

Titles can only been transferred in Colorado through voluntary conveyance between the buyer and seller, or through foreclosure procedure.

 

The purchase of a tax lien does not give the purchaser "possessory/ownership rights" to immediately evict the homeowner. Contrary to law in this case, title was "transferred" without foreclosure on only the "say-so" (dictum) of a court order which even stated that the title conveyance did "not come squarely within the provisions of statute."

26 USC 6340 — Only written evidence of the record is permitted to determine the truthfulness of IRS collection procedure.

Judge Perricone accepted self serving verbal testimony of an IRS agent (coincidently a friend of District Attorney Dave Thomas' wife) instead of the written record, to determine whether tax collection procedure was lawfully followed.

C.R.S. § 4-1-207 — Under protest, with reservation of rights.

Judge Perricone said the homeowner could not utilize this law — they have to ratify fraud even if they protest it every step of the way.

March 1995

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After living for three months in a rented basement, the homeowner was ready for the trial scheduled in March. The Burge's were prepared to defend their title with evidence and an expert witness: an IRS officer who was willing to testify that the property had been taken illegally. Instead of proceeding to trial as the rights granted by both state and federal Constitutions demanded, Judge Perricone announced in open court that morning that he had decided to cancel the scheduled trial. The homeowner was thus unconstitutionally denied her right to a hearing before a jury of their peers.

Instead, Judge Perricone used the time originally allocated for a jury trial to impose a judgement of $50,000 against the homeowner in favor of the auctioneer/investor, a hefty bonus for Behr. This outrageous judgement was classified as "rent" and sanctions against the homeowner for daring to defend their property. Aside from the outrageousness of Judge Perricone's arrogant judgement, the classification of "rent" owed by the homeowner was against the law because past due rent can only be awarded when there was a lease contract in existence. But no such lease agreement existed. These sanctions were, once again, simply legalized theft by Gaspar Perricone.

It is clear that Judge Perricone knew he was violating the law with his orders and judgments against the homeowner. The last sentence of the eviction order states: "The current proceedings do not come squarely within the provisions of statute." The reason the order to evict and convey title "did not come squarely within the provisions of statute" was because Gaspar Perricone had to suppress the homeowner's evidence — and suppressing evidence always requires violating some law. While Burge had provided evidence of fraud, perjury, and tax law violations, in addition to the fact that no state title procedure had been employed prior to the filing of the eviction procedure, Judge Perricone refused to enter such evidence, saying, "we are not a federal court." Burge then pointed out that Judge Perricone should have dismissed the action because he had no subject matter jurisdiction.

Throughout this travesty Judge Gaspar Perricone arrogantly ignored Burge and the law.

Home foreclosure — Case 95 CV 1129

Matter Before the Bar: Title conveyance versus acquiring an " interest" in property — Judge Christopher Munch

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After the Burge's had been evicted from their home in January at Judge Perricone's order, in June 1995 they received a Notice of Intent to Foreclose from the mortgagee, Bank Western. Since there had not been any lawful title conveyance procedure, the bank proceeded to employ foreclosure law upon the owner of record — Burge. Burge had, quite naturally, quit paying the mortgage after Judge Perricone evicted the family from their home.

The Rule 120 hearing under foreclosure law was scheduled and Burge then appeared in front of Judge Christopher Munch.

Burge wanted to use the foreclosure hearing to present the evidence that had been suppressed by Judge Gaspar Perricone. But Judge Munch refused to allow the homeowner an opportunity to defend their property.

The homeowner was asked by Judge Munch if she wanted to redeem the delinquent four months of mortgage payments.

The homeowner said, "Yes."

Judge Munch asked the bank representative if that would be acceptable. They said, "Yes."

Judge Munch said, "Case closed."

But then the homeowner asked if she could move back into her house. Munch said, "Why are you asking that? You still have the right to possession for 75 days after the foreclosure sale which hasn't even taken place yet."

The homeowner said, "Can I have an order to that effect?"

Judge Munch said, "Why?"

Homeowner said, "Because I was illegally evicted already — without a previous foreclosure."

Judge Munch said he would not issue an order to contradict the prior illegal proceedings.

In refusing to follow the law, Christopher Munch again violated the homeowner's rights. However, Judge Munch is protected by "immunity" and the homeowner had no recourse. They are still homeless at the point of a court-ordered gun.

The Relevant Law

How Judge Munch Corrupted The Law

28 USC 2001 or 26 USC 7403

US v Fox, 94 US 315, 320-321

Federal foreclosure procedure

The lien-holder was given an order to evict the homeowner based only on an inferior lien he purchased at a tax lien sale — without employing either state or federal foreclosure procedure.

 

When the first (superior) lien holder (the bank) began a foreclosure — that proved that no lawful title conveyance procedure had taken place earlier —Judge Munch ignored the evidence and affirmed the previous, illegal order which served as a substitute for a proper title conveyance procedure.

Parrish Chiropractic Ctr. v. Progressive Casualty Ins., 874 P. 2d 1049; Wota v. Blue Cross, 831 P. 2d 1037. Courts cannot alter the terms of contracts.

To appease the bank that had been denied a presence before title was conveyed on their superior interest in the property, Judge Munch then provided for the homeowner's mortgage contract to be "assigned" to the lien holder in violation of the mortgage contract itself, which precluded assignment, and in violation of law.

 

To accomplish this Judge Munch simply crossed off the homeowner's name on the mortgage contract and substituted the investor's name. This action denied the homeowner due process and any opportunity to defend their home.

United States District Court — Case 95 S 906

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Because state judge Gaspar Perricone had said that he would not hear issues involving federal law, Burge took the case to federal court in August 1995.

The federal judge Daniel Sparr, said he would not address the challenged IRS procedures because "they were addressed by the state court." (they weren't) and dismissed the case in April, 1996.

However, before Judge Sparr dismissed the case, federal Magistrate Bruce Pringle had allowed discovery to proceed for a year. Discovery procedure in the federal court uncovered irrefutable evidence of fraud committed by the IRS when seizing and selling the home — but then Judge Sparr dismissed the case without hearing it — holding that the state court had taken jurisdiction over the issue even though Judge Perricone had clearly said he would not adjudicate federal law. Burge took that discovery back to the state court under Rule 60(b). In the interim Judge Perricone had retired and Judge Leland Anderson had taken the case.

Colorado District Court — Case 94 CV 1928 (attempt to reopen)

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In April of 1996 Judge Leland Anderson refused to do his duty and examine the law and the evidence, and simply entered an order maintaining the status quo.

The Relevant Law

How Judge Anderson Corrupted The Law

Rule 60(b): Rule 60 (b) is used to reopen a closed case when previously undisclosed evidence of fraud or other malfeasance comes to light.

Because Judge Perricone had disallowed discovery procedures, deprived the homeowner of their right to a jury trial, as well as refusing to address federal tax law, the Plaintiffs took that federal issue into U.S. District court. After acquiring irrefutable evidence of fraud, Burge went back to the state court. Judge Anderson refused to apply the evidence in violation of Rule 60(b).

26 USC 6340 — Only written evidence of the record is permitted to determine the truthfulness of IRS collection procedure.

Judge Anderson accepted self serving verbal testimony of an IRS agent instead of the written record to determine whether tax collection procedure was lawfully followed.

C.R.S. §4-1-207 — Under protest, with reservation of rights.

Judge Leland Anderson said the homeowner could not utilize this law — they have to ratify fraud even if they protest it every step of the way.

But that wasn't the end of it. Burge was able to present the evidence suppressed by state judges Perricone and Anderson — and dismissed by federal district judge Sparr — to the U.S. Senate. In the interim they continued their battle for justice by appealing their case.

Court of Appeals — Case 95 CA 752

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In February, 1997, Judges Karen Metzgar, Arthur Roy, and Claus Hume upheld the illegal eviction, that forced a family with three children into the January cold at the point of a gun, and the voided foreclosure by writing a court order that totally misrepresented the facts and the record.

In their ruling Judges Karen Metzgar, Arthur Roy, and Claus Hume ignored the foreclosure action that clearly exposed that the previous title conveyance procedure and eviction was illegal.

Colorado Supreme Court — Case 97 SC 126

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Burge was denied certiorari in October 1997 because certiorari is only granted to address issues involving the need to interpret new law — the Colorado Supreme Court will not review a case when the issue involves a violated, but already established, law.

United States Supreme Court — Case 97-756

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Denied certiorari.

Testimony before the United States Senate — April 14, 1998

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Later, when the IRS was being investigated for abusing seizure laws, Linda Sanders f/k/a Linda Burge, the homeowner, testified before the U.S. Senate on April 14, 1998, regarding the illegal tax sale.

The IRS Commissioner admitted to the Senate that the IRS had covered up the illegal procedures, described as "errors," in seizing and selling the Burge's home. That admission is documented in Senate Report 105-581, subsequently prepared for the Senate Committee.

Many other improprieties were uncovered during this litigation suggesting that IRS agents in Denver were assisting in other illegal seizures and sales — which is why Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell called for the House Ways and Means Committee to conduct investigations, which they did in April, 1998. Whether or not any of the victims who testified at those hearings were given relief is unknown.

Upon getting the confession from the IRS Commissioner regarding the perjury and "errors" committed against Burge in taking their home and evicting them into the snow of January, Burge asked the IRS for restitution. They said, "sue us."

Burge then used the admission and evidence from the Senate hearing to return to the Colorado courts.

District Court — Case 99 CV 327

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The next action, Burge v. Hembree, was filed as a challenge to the illegal title conveyance under C.R.S. § 38-41-111, and Rule 60(b) under the equitable doctrine rule. This time the issues came before Judge Ruthanne Polidori.

The homeowner again demanded a jury trial because Rule 38 provides that matters involving real property can be heard by a jury. Judge Polidori arrogantly denied the jury trial in order to control the outcome of the case. She refused to accept the evidence of fraudulent title conveyance because, at that time, it would have resulted in serious losses to the insurance company who had insured the title.

Coincidentally, that insurance company is not a well known title company, but one that is held by attorneys who can't get title insurance from reputable companies — Attorney Title Guarantee Fund, 999 18th St., #1101, Denver CO 80202.

Certainly, Burge did not get any relief whatsoever. To add harm to injury, despite the fact that the homeowner was represented by an attorney, Judge Ruthanne Polidori sanctioned Burge personally another $10,000 for bringing the Senate Report into her court.

The Relevant Law

How Judge Polidori Corrupted The Law

C.R.S. § 13-17-102 Sanctions against one signing the pleadings, if the argument is frivolous.

Judge Polidori sanctioned the Plaintiffs $10,000 — but not the attorney who signed the pleadings — for "frivolous argument" even though the there was no evidence entered that rebutted the arguments raised. This sanction did nothing more than legalize theft.

C.R.S. § 18-8-501 et seq. Perjury

Judge Polidori ignored perjury confessed by the federal Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service during Senate Hearings and published in Senate Report 105-581. Polidori also ignored proven perjury perpetrated by the investor and his attorney who had originally acquired the tax deed.

C.R.S. § 38-41-111 - C.R.S. § 38-41-106 : Seven years to challenge whether title conveyance by government sale was lawful.

Judge Polidori refused to apply these statutes and obstructed the remedy for challenging an "official sale."

C.R.S. § 13-8-101 : Three years to bring action for fraud.

Judge Polidori ignored the fact that established case law says the three year limitation does not apply to real property title issues, Munson v Marks, 52 Colo. 553; 124 P. 187 and Ahart v Sutton, 79 Colo. 145; 244 P. 306. Colorado law allows seven years for real property actions. Additionally, Polidori ignored the established case law defining the difference between "assertion of fraud" versus the "discovery of fraud" pursuant to "new evidence" under Rule 60(b). The rule also starts the clock upon discovery of credible evidence — not when the accusation is made.

Rule 38 - Jury determines issue of fraud in real property case ( DeHaas v Empire Petroleum, (Annotations for this rule).

Ruthanne Polidori kept the issue of fraud from a jury.

Court of Appeals — Case 00 CA 328

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Indefatigably, Burge once again appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.

In April, 2001, Judges Leonard Plank, James Casebolt, and Raymond Jones affirmed the outrageous decision that an IRS auction conveys title rather than just "an interest" in the property — in spite of the fact that state law requires that all involuntary conveyances of liens and deeds be foreclosed under state law before title can transfer, C.R.S. § 38-35-117 and § 38-39-102(a)(1).

These judges also affirmed (rubber stamped) Ruthanne Polidori's absurd refusal to acknowledge, and accept into evidence, an official document of the government of the United States, i.e., the Senate Report confessing the illegal IRS procedures used to auction the tax lien.

Lastly, Ruthanne Polidori's sanctions against Burge were upheld even though Burge had been represented by an attorney, who had signed and filed the pleadings. That sanction, $10,000, directly contravenes Court Rule 11, which places any such sanctions or fines against the person signing the pleadings. Again, legalized theft.

The homeowner was finally defeated.

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